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Abstract—Deep learning has been broadly leveraged by major cloud providers, such as Google, AWS and Baidu, to offer various
computer vision related services including image classification, object identification, illegal image detection, etc. While recent works
extensively demonstrated that deep learning classification models are vulnerable to adversarial examples, cloud-based image
detection models, which are more complicated than classifiers, may also have similar security concern but not get enough attention
yet. In this paper, we mainly focus on the security issues of real-world cloud-based image detectors. Specifically, (1) based on effective
semantic segmentation, we propose four attacks to generate semantics-aware adversarial examples via only interacting with black-box
APIs; and (2) we make the first attempt to conduct an extensive empirical study of black-box attacks against real-world cloud-based
image detectors. Through the comprehensive evaluations on five major cloud platforms: AWS, Azure, Google Cloud, Baidu Cloud, and
Alibaba Cloud, we demonstrate that our image processing based attacks can reach a success rate of approximately 100%, and the
semantic segmentation based attacks have a success rate over 90% among different detection services, such as violence, politician,
and pornography detection. We also proposed several possible defense strategies for these security challenges in the real-life situation.
Index Terms—Cloud Vision API, Cloud-based Image Detection Service, Deep Learning, Adversarial Examples.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
TAKING advantage of the availability of big data andthe strong learning ability of neural networks, deep
learning outperforms many other traditional approaches in
various computer vision tasks such as image classification,
object detection, and image segmentation. Since deep learn-
ing often requires massive training data and lengthy train-
ing time, many cloud service providers (such as Google,
AWS, Baidu, Alibaba, Azure) offer deep learning Applicant
Program Interfaces (APIs) for their clients to accomplish
computer vision tasks without the need to train models
and own a big amount of data. These APIs can help cloud
service users check images for both commercial and non-
commercial purposes. For example, the search engine giant
Google1 and Baidu2 allow their APIs to identify the category
of pictures (e.g., dog, cat); Alibaba Cloud3 and Azure4
provide APIs to check whether the images are illegal (e.g.,
pornographic, violent).
However, deep learning has been recently found ex-
tremely vulnerable to adversarial examples, which are
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carefully-constructed input samples that can trick the learn-
ing model into producing incorrect results. Hence, the study
of adversarial examples in deep learning has drawn increas-
ing attention among the security community [1]. In general,
in terms of applications, the research of adversarial example
attacks against cloud vision services can be grouped into
three main categories: self-trained classifier attacks, cloud-based
classifier attacks, and cloud-based detector attacks, as shown in
Table 1 (in this paper, classifiers and detectors refer to the
deep learning models in the image field). An image classifier
utilizes training images to understand how a given input
variable relates to a class. By contrast, an image detector
identifies the bounding areas that are “worth labelling”
in an input image, and then generates a label for each
area. For self-trained classifiers, clients upload the training
data themselves and attackers know the distribution of the
training data in advance [2], [3], [4]. For cloud-based classifiers,
the cloud providers train the classifiers themselves (e.g.,
image classifiers on AWS). Attackers do not have the prior
knowledge and state-of-art attacks are achieved by making
hundreds of thousands of queries to successfully generate
an adversarial example [5], [6]. For cloud-based detectors, the
cloud providers train the detectors themselves and integrate
the detectors into their detection services, e.g., the detection
services for violent and pornographic images provided by
Google. Despite a “classifier” is incorporated in the last step,
cloud-based detectors usually need to contain other modules,
such as object detection, image segmentation, and even
human judgment in some complicated situations. Attacking
cloud-based image detectors is a challenging task since it
is hard to bypass these complicated techniques simultane-
ously to launch a successful attack with limited queries.
Although cloud-based detectors are playing an increas-
ingly important role, there is still limited work exploring
the possibility of adversarial example attacks against the
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2TABLE 1
Cloud-based vision services and attacks.
Vision Model Service Attack Method
self-trained classifier Substitution model [2], MLaaS [3], ZOO [4]
cloud-based classifier Boundary attack [6], Ensemble models [5]
cloud-based detector Work in this paper
detection of cloud vision services. A few of the most recent
works that paid attention to fool image detectors focused on
the standard object detection algorithm [7]. However, such
attacks cannot be readily applied to the cloud environment.
This is because (i) cloud-based detectors contain several
complicated modules (object detection, image segmentation,
human judgment, etc.), and (ii) cloud-based detectors are
presented as black-box to their adversaries. In [38], Flo-
rian et al. succeed to steal a machine learning model via
public APIs by an equation-solving method. However, it is
impractical to attack a commercial model with hundreds
of millions of parameters by a simple equation-solving
method. Furthermore, [38] succeeds to steal a simple model
trained by themselves and it belongs to self-trained classifiers
attack.
To fill this emerging gap, in this work, we take the
first step to present attacks on cloud-based detectors. In order
to conduct a comprehensive study, we consider the image
detector services on five major cloud platforms worldwide
including Baidu Cloud, Google Cloud, Alibaba Cloud, AWS
and Azure. In the rest of this paper, we use “Google”, “Al-
ibaba”, and “Baidu” for short, to present the corresponding
cloud services provided by these companies.
In this study, by incorporating the image semantics
segmentation, we propose four black-box attack methods on
cloud-based detectors, which do not need prior knowledge
of detectors and more importantly, can be achieved within
very limited queries. Specifically, we present the Image
Processing (IP) attack, Single-Pixel (SP) attack, Subject-based
Local-Search (SBLS) attack and Subject-based Boundary
(SBB) attack. Our empirical study demonstrates that the
proposed attacks can successfully fool the cloud-based
detectors deployed on the major cloud platforms with a
remarkable bypass rate even approaching 100% as shown
in Table 2. We summarize our main contributions as follows:
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work
to study black-box attacks on cloud-based detectors
without any access to the training data, model, or
any other prior knowledge. We investigate the com-
ponents of detectors and develop the black-box at-
tacks on the detectors beyond the previous classifier
fooling.
• We propose four attack methods by incorporating
semantic segmentation to achieve a high bypass rate
with a very limited number of queries. Instead of mil-
lions of queries in previous studies, our methods find
the adversarial examples using only a few thousands
of queries.
• We conduct extensive evaluations on the major
cloud platforms worldwide. The experimental re-
sults demonstrate that all major cloud-based detec-
TABLE 2
Success rates of cloud-based detectors attack.
Platforms Detection Services IP SP SBLS SBB
Baidu
violence 100% 88% 100% 91%
politician 100% 96% 60% 82%
pornography 100% 13% 34% 46%
Google violence 100% 8% – 75%pornography 100% 59% – 78%
Alibaba
violence 100% 49% 72% 67%
politician 100% 86% 46% 67%
pornography 100% 12% 19% 36%
AWS politician 100% 84% – –pornography 100% 50% – –
Azure pornography 100% 91% 54% 80%
tors can be bypassed successfully by our attacks. All
the tests only rely on the APIs of these cloud service
providers, which verify the feasibility of our proposal
in practice.
• We discuss the potential defense solutions and the
security issues. By revealing these vulnerabilities,
we provide a valuable reference for academia and
industry for developing an effective defense against
these attacks. We reported the vulnerabilities to the
involved cloud platforms and received very active
and positive acknowledgements from them.
Roadmap In the rest of the paper, we begin with the
preliminary in Section 2, followed by the threat model and
criterion in Section 3. Section 4 describes the details of
our attack algorithms. Section 5 shows experimental results
on the cloud-based detectors. The effects of these attacks
and potential defense methods are discussed in Section 6.
Section 7 summaries the related work. Finally, Section 8
concludes this paper and discusses further work.
2 PRELIMINARY
2.1 Neural Networks and Adversarial Examples
A neural network is a function F (X) = Y that accepts
X ∈ Rn and outputs Y ∈ Rm, where the model is anm-class
classifier, R is the set of real numbers, n is the dimension of
X , and F is the combination of model parameters θ. In this
paper, the parameters of the target model are unknown. The
output Y is an m-dimensional vector < y1, y2, · · · , ym >,
where yi is the probability of each class, 0 ≤ yi ≤ 1, for
1 ≤ i ≤ m and ∑mi=1 yi = 1. We show the architecture
of a Deep Neural Networks (DNN) model in Fig. 1. The
final label L(X) = argmax
i
(yi). Sometimes in response to a
query, cloud models only return a confidence score instead
of a probability distribution. Note that there is no correlation
between scores in different classes. For instance, Alibaba
Cloud only returns a confidence score from 0 to 100 when
being queried. Probability can leak more information than
scores due to the strong correlation between the probabili-
ties and the classes. Our algorithms could be adapted well
in either of the cases (probabilities or scores).
Adversarial example attacks on neural networks were
first proposed by Szegedy [8], wherein well-designed input
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Fig. 1. A neural network example.
samples called adversarial examples are constructed to fool
the learning model. Specifically, adversarial examples are
generated from benign samples by adding small perturba-
tion that is imperceptible to human eyes, i.e., X∗ = X + δX
and F (X∗) = Y ∗, where X∗ is an adversarial example, δX
is the perturbation, and Y ∗ is the adversarial label. Prior
works [9], [10] have shown that adversarial examples are
detrimental to many systems in the real world. For instance,
under adversarial example attacks, the automatic driving
system may take a stop sign as an acceleration sign [9] and
malware can evade the detection systems [10]. Depending
on whether there is a specified target for misclassification,
adversarial example attacks can be categorized into two
types, i.e., targeted and untargeted attacks. Since we only
intend to make the API service generate an incorrect label,
in this paper, we focus on the untargeted attacks.
2.2 Cloud Vision APIs Based on Neural Networks
Due to the high cost of storing massive data and intensive
computational resource usage of training neural networks
for computer vision, it is common in recent years for in-
dividuals and small businesses to use cloud platforms to
train and perform deep learning tasks. The cloud service
providers normally own plenty of data and computing
power, and they actively provide their users with multiple
APIs of pre-trained neural networks as their services. By
leveraging these cloud-based classification and detection
services, a small fee could allow an application to complete
a relatively complicated computer vision task. We list the
computer vision services provided by several major cloud
service providers in the market along with the fees they
charge for 1000 queries in Table 3.
TABLE 3
Services and fees of different cloud vision APIs.
Cloud Platform Classifier Detector Fee/Query
Baidu Y Y 0.17$/1000
Google Y Y 1.5$/1000
Alibaba Y Y 0.27$/1000
Azure Y Y 1$/1000
AWS Y Y 1$/1000
Both classification and detection modules are provided
by these computer vision APIs. The classification module
has many applications such as logo recognition, celebrity
recognition, animal recognition, etc. The Detection module
aims to find illegal images which violate the content security
policy. A detector is more complex than a classifier, as it
involves more components such as object detection and im-
age segmentation. Warnings are generated by cloud-based
detectors when the outputs of models exceed a threshold.
In this paper, we select the most representative image detec-
tion topics, including violence, politics, and pornography.
All experiments are completed only using the free quota
provided by these cloud service providers. This implies that
anyone can launch a successful attack by our models in the
real world with a very low cost.
2.3 White-box and Black-box Attacks
Recent research has proposed several attacks on deep learn-
ing models. Based on the prior knowledge possessed by
attackers, adversarial example attacks can be classified to
white-box and black-box attacks, as shown in Table 4, where
Architecture means the parameters of a model, training tools
mean the training methods used when training the model,
and Oracle means whether the model gives an output when
queried with an input.
TABLE 4
Comparison of the prior knowledge of white-box attacks and black-box
attacks.
Attack types Architecture Training tools Train data Oracle
white-box ! ! ! !
black-box # # # !
In this paper, we only focus on the black-box attacks
against deep learning models, which is even more challeng-
ing due to the limited access to the model. In fact, based
on the block-box attacks, it is straightforward to design the
white-box attacks.
2.4 Image Semantic Segmentation
Semantic segmentation of images includes dividing and rec-
ognizing the contents in the image automatically. Semantic
segmentation processes an image at the pixel level, thus we
can assign each pixel in the image to an object class. With the
proposal of a full convolutional neural network [11], deep
learning has been widely adopted in the field of semantic
segmentation [12] [13] [14] [15].
(a) (b)
Fig. 2. Image semantic segmentation example. (a) is the original image
and (b) is the semantic segmentation of (a). There are two classes in
the original picture: person and horse.
4Through semantic segmentation techniques, we can fo-
cus on the key pixels of an image, where key pixels mean
the important pixels contributed to the classification re-
sult. If we perturb the key pixels, the attacks tend to be
easy to implement. Therefore, the general idea of our at-
tack is using the semantic segmentation model to identify
the pixels of an image, and then perturb the pixels of a
particular class. In this paper, we choose Fully Convolu-
tional Networks (FCN) [11] as the semantic segmentation
model, since FCN is one of the most classical models in
the semantic segmentation filed and is sufficiently good
for us to conduct our attacks. Different from the classic
CNN, which uses a fully connected layer in the final to
obtain a fixed-length feature vector for classification, FCN
can take input an image with arbitrary size and produce
the corresponding sized output with efficient inference and
learning. FCN uses the deconvolution layer to upsample
the feature map of the last convolutional layer, restoring it
to the same size of the input image. Then, pixel-by-pixel
classification is performed on the upsampled feature map.
For an input X , support that P (i, j) is the pixel of X at
the location (i, j), C(P (i, j)) is the class P (i, j) belongs to,
and S is the subject pixel set of the input. For instance,
in Fig. 2, we take a person as the subject class. Thus, we
have S = subject(X) = {P (i, j) : C(P (i, j)) = person}.
Similarly, we can get the set of animal images. The details of
the image semantic segmentation are shown in Table 5.
TABLE 5
Subject class of different images.
Images
Type Violence Politician Pornography
Subject
Class person
personal
face person
In our experiment, the results show that the perturba-
tion based on semantic segmentation could speed up the
generation of adversarial examples in the cases of violence,
politician and pornography.
3 THREAT MODEL AND CRITERION
3.1 Threat Model
In this paper, we assume that the attacker is a client and s/he
can only access the cloud APIs as a black box. The only data
the attacker can collect is the feedback from the cloud API
by the query. Moreover, the attacker can only access the API
with a limited number of queries since it is inefficient and
impractical to conduct a large number of queries on cloud
platforms.
3.2 Criterion and Evaluation
The goal of adversarial example attacks against detection
is to mislead the detector into misclassification. Nina et al.
[16] proposed the concept of top-k misclassification, which
means the network ranks the true label below at least k
other labels. In practice, the cloud-based detectors usually
produce a label (e.g., violent, pornographic, etc.) after pro-
cessing an image, which can be used by websites to judge
the legitimacy of the image. Consequently, we choose the
top-1 misclassification as our criterion, which means that
our attack is successful if the returned label with the highest
probability differs from the correct label.
Evaluating the quality of adversarial images in detection
is a challenge since a detector is largely different from a
classifier and the quality of adversarial examples cannot
be properly measured based on the number of changed
pixels only. For attacking a classifier, the objective is to
perturb as few pixels as possible. For attacking detectors,
however, people can still easily recognize the politician in a
political image, even with many pixels have been perturbed.
If the attacker performs some political activities, such as
insulting slogans, on this disturbing image, the detection
service may fail to block such misdeed. Instead, we consider
three evaluation methods including L0, Peak Signal to Noise
Ratio (PSNR) and Structural Similarity (SSIM). L0 distance
corresponds to the number of pixels that have been altered
in an image. We assume the original input is O, and the
adversarial example is ADV. Then,
L0 : ||z||0 = #{i|zi 6= 0} (1)
where z=O-ADV.
We also use PSNR [17] to measure the quality of images.
PSNR value is measured in dB. Typical PSNR values for
visually-proper images are usually between 20 and 40 dB,
where higher is better [17].
PSNR = 10log10(MAX
2/MSE) (2)
where MAX = 255, and MSE is the mean square error.
For an RGB image (m× n× 3),
MSE =
1
m× n× 3×
2∑
b=0
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
||ADV (i, j, b)−O(i, j, b)||2
(3)
where RGB means three-channel values of pixels, namely,
red, green and blue, and (i, j, b) is a coordinate of an image
for channel b (0 ≤ b ≤ 2) at location (i, j).
To measure the image similarity, the SSIM index is
adopted in this paper [18]. Therefore, L0 distance is used to
measure how many pixels have been changed, while PSNR
is used to measure the image quality, and SSIM measures
the structural similarity. In the following sections, the L0
distance is used to present the L0 distance between the
original image and the adversarial image for short.
4 BLACK-BOX ATTACK ALGORITHMS
In this section, we mainly discuss the black-box attacks
used in our experiments. We list five frequently-used image
processing techniques, which can make image adversarial
in Section 4.1. In Sections 4.2-4.4, we analyze the flaws
of previous literature on adversarial example attacks and
propose our attacks.
4.1 Image Processing based Attack
In the following, we explore the effect of five different image
processing techniques, including Gaussian Noise, Grayscale
Image, Image Binarization, Salt-and-Pepper Noise, and
Brightness Control, under which we take the images after
5(a) Origin (b) Gaussian noise (c) Grayscale (d) Binarization (e) p=0.05 (f) p=0.15
(g) p=0.3 (h) p=0.5 (i) ε=0.1 (j) ε=0.3 (k) ε=0.5 (l) ε=0.8
Fig. 3. Five image processing techniques on a political image. According to the visibility of the image, we set the ε between 0.1 and 0.8, and set p
between 0.05 and 0.5. (e)-(h) are Salt-and-Pepper noises with different parameters. (i)-(l) are Brightness Control attacks with different parameters.
the above image processing techniques as adversarial im-
ages directly. The reason we choose these five techniques
is that they are sufficiently representative. As an empirical
study, we hope our work could be easily extended to other
image processing techniques. All these image processing
techniques are implemented with Python libraries, such as
skimage5, OpenCV6, and PIL7, and we employ the parameters
that can main well image visibility in our evaluation.
4.1.1 Gaussian Noise
Gaussian noise is statistical noise with a probability density
function (PDF) equal to the normal distribution as shown
below.
f(x) =
1√
(2pi)σ
exp(− (x− µ)
2
2σ2
) (4)
where σ and µ represent the mean and variance, respec-
tively. Thus
ADV = O +Noise (5)
Note that, clipping ADV is necessary to maintain a reason-
able RGB value, which is [0, 255]. An example is shown in
Fig. 3 (b).
4.1.2 Grayscale Image
In a grayscale image, the value of each pixel is a single
sample representing the amount of light, i.e., it only carries
intensity information. In the computer vision field, the black
and white image contains only black and white pixels, while
the grayscale image has many levels of color depth between
black and white. To obtain the ADV, the following equation8
is used:
ADV = R ∗ 0.299 +G ∗ 0.587 +B ∗ 0.114 (6)
This function is also implemented in Python library (PIL).
Clipping the ADV is necessary to maintain a reasonable
RGB value. An example is shown in Fig. 3 (c).
5. https://scikit-image.org
6. https://opencv.org
7. http://www.pythonware.com/products/pil
8. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grayscale
4.1.3 Image Binarization
A binary image is a digital image that has two possible
values for each pixel. Typically, the two colors used for a
binary image are black and white. Floyd-Steinberg dithering
[20] is used to approximate the original image luminosity
levels in the implementation of PIL. An example is shown
in Fig. 3 (d).
4.1.4 Salt-and-Pepper Noise
Salt-and-Pepper noise is also known as impulse noise. This
noise can result in sharp and sudden disturbances in the
image signal. For a pixel (i, j, k) of an RGB image, the noise
image of Salt-and-Pepper is calculated by Noise(i, j, k; p),
where Noise is the noise image, and p is the noise density.
The other pixels remain original. We show several examples
in Fig. 3 (e)-(h).
4.1.5 Brightness Control
We hypothesize that the image brightness may affect clas-
sification/detection results. Thus we iteratively adjust the
brightness of an image to observe the change of the result.
A constant value is added to all the pixels of the image at
the same time. Then we clip it to a reasonable range, namely,
[0, 255].
ADV = O + ε ∗ 255 (7)
where ε is the parameter to control brightness, which is in
the range of [0,1]. Several examples on brightness are shown
in Fig. 3 (i)-(l).
4.2 Single-Pixel Attack
The single-pixel attack proposed by Nina et al. [16], is
an attack where the perturbation of a single pixel would
make the classifier generate a wrong label. However, it
suffers from several limitations. First, when processing high-
resolution images, a single pixel is usually not enough to
cause the misclassification. Second, their experiment was
completely offline and the data were fed to the classifiers
directly. For the online classifier in the physical world, their
attack is difficult to succeed.
6To address these problems, we design a new single-pixel
attack by gradually increasing the number of modified pix-
els and integrating the idea of image semantic segmentation.
In order to verify the validity of semantic segmentation, we
implement the attack in three areas of an image, namely,
subject region, non-subject region, and random region. The
random region is chosen as a baseline to compare with the
other two regions. These three regions are formally defined
as follows:
• Subject region: a region composed of all the pixels
which belong to a subject class.
• Non-subject region: a region composed of all the pixels
which do not belong to any subject class.
• Random region: a region composed of all the pixels
chosen from the image randomly.
In the rest of this paper, we name the Single-Pixel attack
as the SP attack since it is inspired by the single-pixel
perturbation.
4.3 Subject-based Local-Search Attack
Nina et al. [16] also proposed a local greedy algorithm that
searches the optimal perturbation of a local area iteratively.
The optimal perturbation is defined as the one that has the
largest influence on the model decision in each iteration.
However, there are flaws that make this attack ineffective on
cloud classifiers or detectors. Firstly, the image data is fed to
a classifier directly. As indicated by Kurakin et al. [22], the
transformations applied to images in the process of printing
them may have a negative effect on adversarial examples.
Our experiment also shows that the JPEG format hinders
adversarial examples to a certain extent, while the PNG
format does not. The reason is that the PNG format uses
lossless compression coding. If the method in [16] sent the
perturbed RGB values to the VGG model [21] and generated
the adversarial example, it may be not adversarial to online
cloud-based classifiers anymore using the JPEG format.
Secondly, their method initialized a very large perturbation
(RGB values exceed 500) to detect the probability changes
of the classifier, which is impractical for the cloud-based
classifier that accepts images with RGB values between 0
and 255. Finally, if the initial disturbance region is very
large, it is easy to fall into a local optimum, making it
difficult to find adversarial examples. Based on the above
reasons, the local greedy algorithm [16] is difficult to apply
to cloud-based classifiers or detectors.
In this paper, we propose a Subject-based Local-Search
(SBLS) attack by incorporating semantic segmentation to
speed up the attack and saving all the images in the PNG
format to retain their original features. Considering the
online models, the initial modified pixel values are 0 or 255.
The main steps of our algorithm, as shown in Algorithm 1,
are summarized as follows.
1) Firstly, we obtain the subject region of the image by
semantic segmentation techniques.
2) Secondly, 50 pixels are selected from the subject
region randomly and we perturb the image on each
of the 50 pixels to generate 50 perturbed images.
The perturbed images are fed to the cloud-based
detector and 50 predictions are produced. The first
N (10 in this paper) pixels for which the probability
drops the most are picked.
3) Thirdly, the image is perturbed on the N pixels and
the algorithm will record whether the prediction
result changes from illegal to normal.
4) Finally, the perturbed image is taken as the initial
image of the next round and cycle through the
above steps until the label becomes normal or the
generation fails.
Algorithm 1 Subject-based Local Search (SBLS) Attack.
Input: image: O, local distance: D, round: R, perturbation
coefficient: P, the number of modified pixels per round:
N, 50 detections per cycle
Output: adversarial example or failure
1: S = subject(O)
2: r = 0
3: while r < R do
4: Locations = random(S, 50)
5: for axis in Locations do
6: Imagetemp = perturb(O, axis, P)
7: Label, Prob = cloud.predict(Imagetemp)
8: if Label ==normal then return Imagetemp
9: end if
10: Probs.append(Prob)
11: end for
12: Index = argsort(Probs)[:N]
13: for i in Index do
14: O = perturb(O,Locations[i],P)
15: end for
16: Label, Prob = cloud.predict(O)
17: if Label ==normal then return O
18: end if
19: Locations = Locations+D
20: end while
21: return Failure;
In Algorithm 1, subject(O) means getting the sub-
ject region of O, random(S, 50) means getting 50 pixels
of S randomly, perturb(O, axis, P) means the perturba-
tion of O on location axis with the coefficient P , and
cloud.predict(Imagetemp) means getting the label and prob-
ability of Imagetemp from a cloud API. Here, we assume that
the cloud APIs will return both the label and the probability
(score). Since the initial images contain illegal contents, we
iterate until the labels become normal or the algorithm fails.
4.4 Subject-based Boundary Attack
Boundary Attack solely relies on the final model deci-
sion [6], which is also called the decision-based attack. A
decision-based attack starts from a large adversarial per-
turbation and then seeks to reduce the perturbation while
staying adversarial. This method works in theory but not
efficiently. As reported, about 1.2 million predictions were
used in the Boundary Attack to find an adversarial image
for ResNet-50 [6], which is a huge overhead for the cloud
service APIs. If we want to generate hundreds of adversarial
images, the required time and expense will be unbearable.
To make the attack practical, we design a new Subject-
based Boundary (SBB) attack by incorporating the semantic
7segmentation and a greedy algorithm. By semantic seg-
mentation, the subject region is first perturbed with the
average RGB value of the non-subject region, since the
background color has a great influence on the recognition of
a subject class based on the previous experiments. Through
the greedy algorithm, the attack is able to recover as many
of the perturbed pixels as possible, making the probability
of correct classification as small as possible. The main steps
of the algorithm, as shown in Algorithm 2, are summarized
as follows.
1) First, all pixels in the subject region are perturbed,
which keep the image free of illegal content and the
probability of being predicted to be illegal closing to
zero.
2) Then, theL0 distance between the current perturbed
image and the original image is computed. A certain
percentage of pixels, which are selected from the
different pixels between the original image and the
perturbed one, are recovered randomly.
3) Next, the recovery process is repeated to choose the
best recovering, which leads to the slowest increase
in prediction probability or score, given that the
perturbed image is still recognized as normal by the
cloud API.
4) Finally, repeat steps 2-3 until the image is correctly
classified. If the perturbed image is recognized as
illegal, the iteration will be stopped and the last
perturbed image will be returned as the adversarial
image.
Algorithm 2 Subject-based Boundary (SBB) Attack.
Input: Oringin image: O, round: R, detetions: D,
Output: adversarial examples;
1: S = subject(O),
2: Non-S = O - subject(O),
3: averpixel = getaverpixel(Non-S),
4: ADV = perturb(O, S, Averpixel)
5: while r < R do
6: Step = L0(O, adv)/10+100
7: for j = 0; j < detections; j ++ do :
8: Advtemp = recover(step, O, ADV)
9: Advcandidate.append(advtemp)
10: Label, Prob = cloud.predict(Advtemp)
11: if Label ==normal then
12: Probs.append(Prob)
13: end if
14: end for
15: if len(Probs)==0 then
16: break
17: end if
18: Index = argmax(probs)
19: ADV = Advcandidate[Index]
20: end while
21: return ADV ;
In Algorithm2, getaverpixel (Non-S) means getting the
average pixel value of a Non-S region, L0(O,ADV) means
getting the L0 norm distance between O and ADV , and
recover(step, O, ADV) means recovering step pixels according
to the difference of O and ADV .
5 EVALUATION
5.1 Validation of Semantic Segmentation
Since cloud-based detectors are based on classifiers and
attacking detectors is more difficult than classifiers, we first
conduct the SP attack on classifiers to better understand the
validity of semantic segmentation. The results on classifiers
can help us adjust our attack algorithms. We choose the
SP attack because it leverages coarse-grained perturbation.
If the SP attack works well with semantic segmentation
techniques, SBLS and SBB attacks should have better per-
formance since both of them leverage fine-grained pertur-
bation. Several local models and a cloud-based classifier
are used in the experiment. The local models we are using
are VGG16 [23], Resnet50 [24] and InceptionV3 [25]. In this
paper, we leverage the Keras framework and pre-trained
deep learning models9 to conduct experiments. These pre-
trained models are trained with ImageNet since it is a
widely used standard dataset. Further, due to the easier
usage of Baidu APIs, we choose Baidu animal classifier as
an example case in our evaluation.
5.1.1 Datasets
We prepare the dataset by selecting 100 animal images from
the ImageNet dataset. Because VGG16 and Resnet50 both
accept input images of size 224×224×3, every input image
is clipped to the size of 224×224×3. Here, we select animal
images for simplicity. The attack strategy mainly consists of
two parts: perturbation methods and perturbation regions.
• Different methods of perturbation have different ef-
fects on the prediction results. Three types of pertur-
bation are considered: P=0, P=255, and P=2, where
P is a perturbation parameter. For instance, P=0 or
255 means setting the RGB value of the pixel to 0
or 255, where 0 represents black and 255 represents
white. P=2 means multiplying the pixel value by 2
and clipping it to a reasonable range. An example of
different perturbation methods is shown in Fig. 4.
• In order to verify the effectiveness of semantic seg-
mentation in perturbation, the three perturbation
regions described in Section 4.2 are chosen to test.
5.1.2 Results and Analysis
First, we carry out a precursor experiment by 1) perturbing
pixels that do not belong to subject class using different per-
turbation methods; 2) recording the changes in prediction.
(a) P=0 (b) P=255 (c) P=2
Fig. 4. The pixels of background are set as different P values. Here we
just change the pixels of the non-subject region.
The overall result is shown in Table 6. From Table 6, it
is evident that the perturbation of the non-subject region
9. https://github.com/fchollet/deep-learning-models/releases
8can cause a misclassification rate of up to 0.8. VGG16 is
the least resilient one, while InceptionV3 and Baidu are the
two most robust models. Besides, the results of P=2 have
the lowest successful misclassification rate among the three
perturbation methods since it is a slight perturbation. We
can also see from the result that about 60% image classifica-
tions of InceptionV3 are not affected by the perturbation on
the background pixels. Thus, it is necessary to perturb the
subject pixels to improve the power of the attack.
TABLE 6
Successful misclassification rate. We perturb all the pixels of the
non-subject region and record the corresponding misclassification rate.
Background VGG16 Resnet50 InceptionV3 Baidu (Online)
P=255 0.8 0.58 0.38 0.40
P=2 0.53 0.41 0.25 0
P=0 0.68 0.56 0.39 0.40
We conduct a number of experiments to understand the
choice of perturbation parameters and regions on different
models, as shown in Fig. 5. Firstly, we adjust the number
of perturbed pixels and record the effects on four classifiers.
As shown in Fig. 5 (a), the number of successful attacks
increases as the number of perturbed pixels increases. After
reaching a large perturbation, the success rate increases very
slowly. Compared to the local classifiers, attacking Baidu is
more difficult.
Secondly, for a single classifier, we select the perturbation
regions in three different ways to observe the changes in
the prediction results. We take the online classifier Baidu
for example. Fig. 5 (b) shows that it is very sensitive to
perturb the pixels in the subject region, resulting in a
high misclassification rate. Fig. 5 (b) also demonstrates the
results when we use P=2 to perturb the pixels. However,
surprisingly, the perturbation in random regions performs
even better than subject regions. Our conjecture is that slight
perturbation in the non-subject region makes the pixels after
perturbation close to those in the subject region. In order
to verify our conjecture, we perturb the non-subject pixels
with the average RGB value of the subject region. For all
pixels in the subject region, the average RGB value in each
channel is computed and the non-subject region is perturbed
with the derived average value. The results in Fig. 5 (c)
demonstrate that the perturbation with the average value
performs better than that with P=2. When perturbing 2000
pixels, the perturbation with the average value performs the
best.
Conclusions. We draw the following conclusions based
on the results from classifiers:
• Among our evaluation, the online models of Baidu
have relatively good robustness and attacking its
online models is more difficult than attacking local
models using the same number of perturbed pixels.
• Perturbations in subject regions are more effective
than other regions.
• The prediction of the model is sensitive to the mag-
nitude of the disturbance value, especially the value
close to the pixels of the subject region.
5.2 Attacking Cloud-based Detectors
5.2.1 Datasets and Preprocessing
To test cloud-based detectors, 300 images are selected from
Google Images or Baidu Images. For the three kinds of ille-
gal images to be detected, 100 images for each kind are man-
ually selected and labeled. All the images are resized to a
fixed size: 224×224×3. Among the detectors we tested, they
accept most image formats, such as JPG, PNG, JPEG, BMP,
etc. It is worth to mention that for our real-life cloud-based
setting, we have to adjust these images properly followed
the requirements of the tested APIs, including input format,
size, and resolution. All these images were collected legally.
In order to avoid image loss during image compression and
transmission, all the images in our experiments are saved
with the PNG format and sent directly to the cloud API
interface without additional transformations. Because the
images are labeled by us, the illegal images may not be
identified as illegal by the evaluated detectors. Therefore,
we first filter the not qualified images by calling the detec-
tors. Specifically, the detectors will return the corresponding
predictions, which are made up of probabilities (scores) and
labels. Then, we discard the images with ambiguous labels
while keeping the images labelled with illegal by both us
and the evaluated detectors. For instance, Alibaba offers
an option for manual reviewing to suspicious images and
we exclude such images. For Google’s detector, we can
only obtain a single-world result, e.g., POSSIBLE, LIKELY as
shown in Table 8. Only the images whose labels are LIKELY
and VERY LIKELY are kept. Finally, the predictions of the
remaining images are recorded in Table 7, where “–” means
the platform does not provide the API service.
TABLE 7
Correct label by cloud APIs.
Platforms Pornography Violence Politician
Baidu 95/100 32/100 45/100
Google 90/100 30/100 –
Alibaba 67/100 67/100 49/100
Azure 54/100 – –
AWS 84/100 – 57/100
According to Table 7, for porn images, we can learn
that Baidu, which labels 95% of them correctly, has done
a better job than other cloud platforms. To our surprise,
46% of the pornographic images have not been identified
by Azure’s detector. For violent images, Alibaba’s detector
has the best performance and it labels 67% of them correctly.
The detectors of Google and Baidu only recognize 30% and
32% of the violent images, respectively. One possible reason
is that the scenes of violent images are more complex and
the detectors do not consider a variety of scenarios.
To better understand the quality of these images, we
record the probabilities or scores when the API is called to
detect these images. The detailed information can be found
in Fig. 6. As shown in Fig. 6, the majority of images are
labeled by the APIs with very high confidence. For Azure’s
detector, 80% of the probability labels are over 0.7. It is more
convincing for our evaluation to leverage images that are
correctly classified by the detectors with high confidence.
Otherwise, a small perturbation may cause the images to
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Fig. 5. In (a), we randomly select pixels on the image to perturb and increase the number of perturbed pixels. The figure records the number of
misclassifications under different numbers of perturbed pixels. In (b), we test different regions of the image with P = 255 and P = 2 and record
the number of successful misclassification. The horizontal axis is the number of perturbed pixels, and the vertical axis is the number of successful
misclassification. In (c), we perturb the pixels in the non-subject region with different P values. P = average means that we perturb the non-subject
region with the average RGB value of the subject region.
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Fig. 6. The probabilities and scores of test images. Most points are concentrated around high probabilities. Besides, many points are overlapped
where the probability is 1 or the score is 100.
evade the detection with low confidence, which cannot
indicate the strength of our attacks.
In our experiments, considering misclassification only is
not enough. The detector may give a similar prediction to
illegal images though the predictions changed. For example,
the prediction may go from VERY LIKELY to LIKELY, which
does not make the detector give a completely opposite
prediction. Therefore, the successful adversarial examples
in our experiments are defined as the examples that have
completely changed the prediction. Then, we use the three
metrics in Section 3.2 to measure the quality of these adver-
sarial examples.
5.2.2 Detectors of Pornographic Images
The Internet is flooded with pornographic images, which
is a serious problem for website regulators. Websites often
leverage detectors to detect these illegal images. Evasion
attacks on these detectors can result in serious content
security risks. Our considered cloud platforms all provide
the pornographic image detection service as shown in Table
8.
Image Processing. The success rates of IP attacks are
shown in Fig. 7 (a). From Fig. 7 (a), we find that the detec-
tors of Azure, AWS, and Google on pornographic images
are vulnerable to the Gaussian noise attack. The Grayscale
attack has a slight effect on Google and Azure, and no effect
on Baidu and Alibaba. For Salt-and-Pepper and Brightness
attacks, their success rates all increase as the parameters (ε
and p) increase.
TABLE 8
Forms of prediction. We record the returned information and labels for
every platform.
Cloud Feedback Label Category
Baidu Probability Porn, Sexy, Normal
Google N
UNKNOWN, VERY UNLIKELY,
UNLIKELY, POSSIBLE, LIKELY,
VERY LIKELY
Alibaba Score porn, sexy, normal
Azure Probability True, False
AWS Score
Explicit Nudity, Nudity,
Graphic Female/Male Nudity,
Sexual Activity, Suggestive,
Female/Male Swimwear Or Underwear,
Revealing Clothes, No label (normal)
In order to further evaluate the successful adversarial
images, the PSNR value [17] is used. The average PSNR
value of the successful adversarial images is shown in Fig.
7 (b). As shown in Fig. 7 (b), we can learn that the re-
sults of Gaussian and Grayscale attacks are very promising.
The Binarization attack makes pornographic images contain
only black and white pixels, which significantly reduces the
content visibility. Thus, the PSNR values are very small. For
Salt-and-Pepper and Brightness attacks, we keep increasing
the attack parameters (ε and p) until the attack is successful.
The CDF plots of the success rates are shown in Fig. 8. In Fig.
8 (a), we can see that the success rate reaches 100% when the
p of Salt-and-Pepper is 0.1 for the detectors of Google, AWS
and Azure. However, the detectors of Baidu and Alibaba
require more Salt-and-Pepper noise to achieve high success
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(a) Success rates (b) PSNR values
Fig. 7. The performance of the IP attack on pornographic images.
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Fig. 8. Cumulative distribution function. (a) is the CDF of the success rates for the Salt-and-Pepper attack and (b) is the CDF of the success rates
for the Brightness attack. The horizontal axis is the corresponding parameter.
rates. In Fig. 8 (b), we see that the Brightness attack needs
a large ε to achieve high success rates, which on the other
hand affects the image quality greatly.
Single-Pixel Attack. We conduct the Single-Pixel (SP)
attack on the cloud platforms with perturbation in different
regions of images, as shown in Fig. 9 (a), where *-s means
the perturbation of the subject region, and *-r means the
perturbation of the random region. As shown in Fig. 9 (a),
the effect of the perturbation in the subject region is much
more significant than that in the random region, which
verifies the validity of semantic segmentation. Besides, we
find that the attack success rate can be increased by perturb-
ing more pixels on the subject regions. Moreover, even if
2000 pixels are perturbed, the success rates of attacks on
Baidu and Alibaba still remain low, whereas 91% of the
same perturbed pornographic images can bypass Azure’s
detector. This demonstrates that the detectors of Baidu and
Alibaba are more resilient to the SP attack than others.
Now, we evaluate the image quality after perturbing the
subject regions. The PSNR values are shown in Fig. 9 (b).
The majority of the PSNR values are larger than 20, which
means the quality of most successful adversarial images are
in the acceptable range.
Subject-based Local-Search Attack. We set the maxi-
mum number of cycles R to 30 in the Subject-based Local-
Search (SBLS) attack. Besides, we set P to 255 and D to
10, which correspond to the RGB value and expanding 10
unit pixels in the next loop as described in Algorithm 1,
respectively. Previous experiments have demonstrated the
effectiveness of semantic segmentation. Thus, the evaluation
of subject-based adversarial images is statistically analyzed
in the following subsections. We skip Google’s detector for
the SBLS attack since Google’s does not return probability
or score that the SBLS attack is relying on. We also do not
conduct the SBLS attack or SBB attack on AWS’s detector
since AWS only provides 5000 queries each month for free,
which is not enough for us to test hundreds of images with
the SBLS attack or SBB attack.
The results of this attack are shown in Fig. 10. Seen from
Fig. 10, Azure’s detector is the weakest and 54% adversarial
images can bypass Azure’s detector. Furthermore, since the
minimumL0 distance is 10, 50 queries are sufficient for SBLS
to generate an adversarial image. Note that the prediction is
normal, not a similar illegal category. The success rates of
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Fig. 10. The performance of the SBLS attack on pornographic images.
attacking Baidu and Alibaba are 34% and 19%, respectively.
Although the success rate on Alibaba’s detector is the low-
est, its average L0 distance is only 142, which implies that
we only modify about 0.01%-0.6% pixels of the whole image
(224×224 pixels). Among the successful adversarial images,
all SSIM values are over 0.9 and all PSNR values are over 20.
This suggests that the quality of these adversarial images is
very high. It is easy for people to observe the pornographic
information from these adversarial images.
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Fig. 11. The performance of the SBB attack on pornographic images.
Subject-based Boundary Attack. Finally, we conduct the
Subject-based Boundary (SBB) attack as described in Algo-
rithm 2. Initially, we set D = 30, Step = L0(I, adv)/10 +
100. The step size is set based on the tradeoff between
accuracy and efficiency. As the number of iterations in-
creases, more and more pixels of the original images are
recovered. In order to guarantee the quality of the adver-
sarial examples, we only consider adversarial examples that
recover more than 80% of the pixels in this paper. Finally,
the success rates of attacking Azure and Google are 80%
and 78%, respectively. Besides, the success rates of attacking
Baidu and Alibaba are about 40%. The evaluation of these
adversarial examples is shown in Fig. 11. The successful
adversarial images have lower similarity than that of the
SBLS attack. However, good adversarial examples still exist.
For Baidu’s detector, the minimum L0 distance is 84 and
the maximum SSIM value is 0.97. For Azure’s detector, the
minimum L0 distance is 48 and the maximum SSIM value is
0.98. The majority of PSNR values are over 20, which means
good image quality.
5.2.3 Detectors of Violent Images
Similarly, violent images are segmented with the semantic
segmentation model FCN first. Note that we only consider
the violent images which contain persons. In fact, a person
is a subject class and plays an important role in the identifi-
cation of violent images. In the subsequent experiments, we
focus on perturbing in the subject regions except IP attacks.
Image Processing. The success rates of IP attacks are
shown in Fig. 12 (a). We find that the success rates of IP
attacks are extremely high and the violent image detectors
are easier to attack than that of pornographic image detec-
tors. Similar to pornographic images, Gaussian noise and
Grayscale attacks can generate adversarial violent images
with high quality according to their PSNR values as shown
in Fig. 12 (b). We show some successful adversarial images
in Fig. 13.
Single-Pixel Attack. The success rates of SP attacks
are shown in Fig. 14 (a). To our surprise, the detectors
of Baidu and Alibaba are not resistant against the SP
attacks on violent images, which is very different from
their performance on the pornographic images. Google’s
detector shows good resilience on detecting violent images
since we cannot launch a successful SP attack with small
perturbation. We speculate that different companies have
different content security priorities. For instance, Google in
the United States may focus more on images filled with
violence and terrorism, while Baidu and Alibaba in China
are faced with stricter censorship on pornographic images.
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Fig. 12. The performance of the IP attack on violent images.
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Fig. 13. Examples on violent images: (a) and (d) are original violent
images, (b) and (e) are images with Gaussian noise, and (c) and (f) are
grayscale version of the original images.
Subject-based Local-search Attack. Similarly, the SBLS
attacks are conducted on violent images. We set P to 255 or
0 for different platforms and we choose the best results. The
results are shown in Fig. 15. The success rates of attacking
Baidu and Alibaba are 100% and 72%, respectively, given
a limited number of queries. For instance, to successfully
attack Baidu’s detector, we only need 200 queries and mod-
ify 38 pixels on average. Besides, the average SSIM value is
about 0.99 for Baidu’s detector, which reveals a high quality
of the adversarial images.
Subject-based Boundary Attack. We also carry out the
SBB attack on violent images. The results are shown in Fig.
17. The success rates of SBB attacks in all the scenarios are
over 67%, while the quality of the adversarial images are not
as good as that of SBLS, even SBB works better on violent
images than pornographic images.
A successful adversarial image is shown in Fig. 18. We
keep restoring the pixel until the detector recognizes it as
illegal. In round 22 the detector identifies the image as
violent, and thus the image of round 21 is chosen as the
final adversarial image.
5.2.4 Detectors of Political Images
Both Baidu and Alibaba provide the cloud service to detect
whether a picture contains politicians, since sensitive politi-
cal images can be insulted on the Internet. We are interested
in exploring the adversarial attacks that aim to interfere
with the results from detectors of such political images.
The political images come from several countries, such as
the United States, Japan, South Korea, etc. The subject of
political images is defined as a person’s face since faces
determine the identification of politicians. In order to find
the location of the face in the image, we adopt face detection
service on open cloud platforms. In this paper, we choose
the face detection API from Baidu since it is free and easy
to use. We only need to perturb the face area rather than
the entire person’s pixels, which can speed up our attacks
except for IP attacks.
Image Processing. Firstly, IP attacks are used to test
political images. We find that the success rates of Gaussian
noise attacks on Baidu and Alibaba are about 76% and 57%,
respectively. For AWS’s detector, its success rate is 45%. 20%
and 33% images can evade Baidu’s and Alibaba’s detection
respectively using the Grayscale attack. To our surprise, Bi-
narization attacks perform very well. Unlike pornographic
and violent images, low-quality political images do not af-
fect human judgment. Several successful adversarial images
of the Binarization attack are shown in Fig. 19. Although the
quality of the images is low after binarization, we can still
recognize these politicians easily.
Single-Pixel Attack. The success rates of the SP attack
are shown in Fig. 14 (b). Based on the figure, political images
are vulnerable to SP attacks. Even hundreds of pixels are
perturbed, the quality of images is still acceptable.
Subject-based Local-Search Attack. Next, we conduct
the SBLS attack on political images. The success rates of
Baidu’s and Alibaba’s detectors are 60% and 46%, respec-
tively, with 222 and 382 queries are made. Here we show an
example in Fig. 20. The L0 distance between Fig. 20 (a) and
Fig. 20 (b) is 10, which means we only perturb 10 pixels to
make the image adversarial. Among all successful examples
on Baidu’s detector, the average L0 distance is 54, and the
average SSIM value is 0.98. Fig. 20 (c) is an adversarial
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(a) Violent images (b) Political images
Fig. 14. SP attack on violent and political images. The horizontal axis is the number of perturbed pixels, and the vertical axis is the success rate of
the attack. In the left, the success rate of Google’s detector is 0 all the time. As the number of perturbed pixels increases, more and more illegal
images cannot be detected by the detectors of Alibaba and Baidu.
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Fig. 15. The performance of the SBLS attack on violent images.
(a)Alibaba SSIM =0.97 (b)Baidu SSIM=0.98
PSNR=34 PSNR =32
Fig. 16. (a) is the adversarial image of Fig. 13 (d) on Alibaba’s detector,
and (b) is the adversarial image of Fig. 13 (a) on Baidu’s detector. The
SSIM values and PSNR values are all pretty high, which means the
perturbation is small and the similarity between the adversarial image
and the original image is high.
 % D L G X  $ O L E D E D  * R R J O H
 3 O D W I R U P V
 
    
    
    
    
 / 
  '
 L V
 W D
 Q F
 H
 % D L G X  $ O L E D E D  * R R J O H
 3 O D W I R U P V
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 3 6
 1
 5
 % D L G X  $ O L E D E D  * R R J O H
 3 O D W I R U P V
   
   
   
   
   
 6 6
 , 0
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 17. The performance of the SBB attack on violent images.
round 1 round 5 round 7
round 9 round 11 round 13
round 15 round 17 round 21
Fig. 18. A successful example of SBB on Baidu’s detector. In round 21,
the image is still adversarial and the L0 distance between it and the
original image is just 10, which means we only perturb 10 pixels.
(a)Vladimir Putin (b) Barack Obama (c)Barack Obama
Fig. 19. (a),(b) and (c) are all binary images. They are all labeled as
normal, while their original images are all labeled as politician.
image misclassified by Alibaba’s detector. Even noticeable
perturbation have been added in this image, people can still
recognize Mr. Barack Obama easily through the adversarial
image. In other words, if we upload the image to the cloud,
the detector will not give any warning about the politician.
Subject-based Boundary Attack. Finally, we examine
the robustness of online detectors against the SBB attack. Ac-
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(a)Original (b)Adversarial (c)Adversarial
Fig. 20. An example adversarial image on Baidu (b) and Alibaba (c).
cording to our results, we can make 82% images adversarial
against Baidu’s detector and 67% images adversarial against
Alibaba’s detector. Moreover, the attack only needs 601 and
375 queries on average, respectively. At the meantime, a
high quality can be maintained on the generated adversarial
images.
6 DISCUSSION
6.1 Effect of Attacks
Unlike previous attacks, our attacks do not require massive
queries. For some attack methods (e.g., IP attacks), the
detectors can be bypassed without any queries. For an
iteration-based attack, only less than two thousand queries
are needed to generate a good adversarial image, which can
be done with the free quota. Based on our investigation,
almost all the major cloud service providers allow a trial
period for registered users and have free invocation quotas
to their APIs. Because of the effective attack design, all of
our experiments can be completed leveraging the obtained
free trials.
To achieve different goals, the proposed attacks can be
launched in different scenarios. If the attacker cannot query
the APIs frequently, the single-step IP and SP attacks can
be launched. If the attacker can freely query the APIs, they
can get the adversarial examples with good quality through
iterative SBLS and SBB attacks. The success rates of IP
and SP attacks are higher than that of the SBLS and SBB
attacks, while the adversarial examples generated by SBLS
and SBB attacks have higher quality than that of the IP
and SP attacks. The attacker can adjust the attack methods
according to the actual environments.
6.2 Defenses
Since these attacks pose a significant threat to cloud services,
it is crucial to design defense mechanisms against these
attacks. In [26] [27] [28], adversarial training is proposed
to improve the robustness of deep learning models. They
iteratively create a set of adversarial examples and include
them into the training data. Retraining a model with new
training data may be helpful. For instance, cloud service
providers can collect plenty of grayscale and binarization
images or adversarial examples which are generated from
the SBLS attacks and SBB attacks. Although adversarial
training can defend against these attacks to a certain extent,
obtaining adversarial examples is costly.
In [29] [30], the researchers proposed a mechanism
where a detection is needed before feeding data to models.
Certainly, detecting inputs can avoid some strange adver-
sarial examples. However, this also increases increase false
TABLE 9
The analysis of queries required for iterative attacks.
SBLS SBB
Type Platform max median min max median min
Porn
Google - - - 1080 660 180
Azure 550 50 50 1500 990 240
Baidu 1350 350 100 2820 1710 210
Alibaba 1302 618 152 330 240 150
Violence
Google - - - 660 540 240
Baidu 1100 150 50 1500 780 90
Alibaba 1301 251 3 1080 780 210
Politician Baidu 650 250 50 1650 690 60Alibaba 784 101 4 900 360 60
positives, since the input in the real world may be similar to
an adversarial example. Besides, in [31], the authors showed
that the detection mechanism can be bypassed as well. In
[32] [33], randomization was proposed for mitigating adver-
sarial effects. The models make decisions through multiple
classifiers, which can increase the robustness of them. Ad-
versarial training, detecting inputs and randomization rely
on the protected model or employed training datasets, while
we did not have the chance of experimenting with them as
detectors are host by third-parties.
Since our attacks (SBLS, SBB) rely on confidence, round-
ing confidence scores of the output is a potential good
defense. However, the outputs of APIs in our experiments
are not always the exact probability values but also some
scores represent confidence, which implies that, the cloud
platforms may have already deployed the defense. For
instance, the outputs of AWS and Alibaba Cloud are rough
scores and Google Cloud returns a word instead of a numer-
ical representation. Although these outputs are not precise
confidence values, our attacks can still achieve high success
rates, as shown in Section 5.2. If the detectors output labels
only, it will hinder our iterative attacks. On the other hand,
this method is not friendly to the users either and cannot
help users understand the detection results.
Limiting the number of queries is a straightforward
strategy since our SBLS and SBB attacks require iterative
queries. Specifically, we statistically calculate the successful
adversarial examples of iterative attacks as shown in Table
9. We count the median, maximum and minimum numbers
of queries required to generate adversarial examples. In our
experiments, we do not need massive queries to launch an
iterative attack. The maximum number of queries is less
than 3000, and over a half are no more than 1000. Therefore,
limiting the number of queries to a large threshold does not
work. Besides, many websites which rely on cloud services
may call the APIs multiple times within a short period to
review the content of their webpages.
In [19], the authors claimed that noise filters could be
an effective method to eliminate the adversarial attacks. In
order to understand whether the noise filter is effective,
we implement it offline and the noise filter only processes
the images sent to the cloud-based detectors. In our ex-
periments, we select the Gaussian Filter and Median Filter
since the Gaussian filter can handle Gaussian noise and
the Median Filter can handle Salt-and-Pepper noise. For
Binarization, Brightness, and Grayscale attacks, we also use
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TABLE 10
The comparison of IP attacks under different noise filters.
AWS Alibaba Azure Baidu Google
porn politician porn politician violence porn porn politician violence porn violence
Binarization
Original 0.98 0.99 0.88 0.9 0.96 0.88 1 1 1 1 1
Gaussian Filter 0.79 0.68 0.48 0.59 0.73 0.16 0.22 0.68 1 1 0.68
Median Filter 0.98 0.94 0.88 0.9 0.88 0.88 1 0.98 1 1 0.87
Brightness
Original 1 0.88 0.96 1 0.87 1 0.55 1 1 0.99 0.62
Gaussian Filter 0.98 0.72 0.98 0.95 0.52 0.34 0.63 0.87 0.91 0.97 0.62
Median Filter 0.94 0.81 0.97 1 0.55 0.3 0.7 0.92 1 0.97 0.68
Gaussian noise
Original 0.46 0.45 0.03 0.57 0.43 0.56 0.02 0.76 0.45 0.54 0.56
Gaussian Filter 0.22 0.35 0.1 0.51 0.09 0.2 0.05 0.55 0.2 0.38 0.13
Median Filter 0.37 0.44 0.42 0.53 0.12 0.4 0.04 0.62 0.28 0.43 0.18
Grayscale
Original 0.11 0.07 0 0.33 0.19 0.22 0 0.2 0.84 0.04 0.31
Gaussian Filter 0.11 0.05 0.22 0.31 0.13 0.1 0.04 0.22 0.35 0.04 0.43
Median Filter 0.07 0.06 0.22 0.31 0.13 0.16 0.03 0.33 0.55 0.04 0.31
Salt-and-Pepper
Original 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Gaussian Filter 0.98 0.83 0.61 0.98 0.99 1 1 1 1 1 0.63
Median Filter 0.08 0.26 0.07 0.46 0.1 1 0.9 1 1 1 0.61
both the Gaussian filter and Median Filter to process them
since there is not a specific filter to handle them. To test
IP attacks, we record the success rates of attacks with or
without noise filters. The results are shown in Table 10.
From Table 10, we can clearly see a decline in the success
rates of Gaussian noise attacks and Salt-and-Pepper attacks.
However, for Azure, Baidu, and Google, the success rates
of Salt-and-Pepper attacks remain high even under the
Gaussian Filter. We analyze these adversarial examples and
find that the perturbation parameters of Salt-and-Pepper
noise are almost twice as large as the original adversarial
examples’. Besides, the Gaussian Filter is more effective than
the Median Filter to defend against Binarization attacks.
However, the Gaussian Filter and Median Filter affect the
accuracy of the detection models to a certain extent.
As for SP, SBLS and SBB attacks, they can be considered
as adding noise to the images. Therefore, the Gaussian Filter
and Median Filter are also selected in our experiments.
The experimental results show that the Gaussian Filter has
almost no impact on the SP attacks. The Median Filter can
reduce the success rates of SP attacks on pornography to
less than 5%, and cut the success rates of SP attacks on
violent and political images in half. Through the observa-
tion of filtered images, we think the Median Filter allows
pornographic images to show more pixels of the skin color,
making them easier for detection, while the elimination
of random noise from violent and political images also
increases their blurring. To simulate noise filters on cloud
platforms, noise filters are adopted in each iteration of SBLS
and SBB. Then the final success rates of the attacks are
recorded. During our experiments, we find that the Gaus-
sian Filter has little impact on either SBLS or SBB attacks.
When using the Median Filter, SBLS attacks cannot work
since they try to capture the difference of the prediction
caused by small perturbations in each iteration, while the
Median filter can easily filter out small perturbations. For
SBB attacks, the Median Filter could be able to reduce the
success rates by approximately 10%. The reason is that the
initial perturbation of SBB attacks is large, and the Median
Filter does not work well for large perturbations in the
region. Nevertheless, with the deployment of noise filters,
we need more perturbations to launch successful attacks.
In summary, we find that the Median Filter can resist
most Salt-and-Pepper noise attacks, SP attacks, and SBLS
attacks. The Gaussian filter can resist most Gaussian noise
attacks. However, it is difficult for cloud-based detectors to
deploy a uniform filter and thus it is difficult to simulta-
neously defend against all kinds of attacks. In addition, the
noise filters will also introduce a decrease in model accuracy.
7 RELATED WORK
Previous works mainly study the security and privacy of
deep neural networks under white-box models [8] [34]
[26] [35] [36] [37]. In the white-box setting, the attacker
can obtain the adversarial examples quickly and accurately.
Besides, the perturbation is small. However, it is usually
difficult for an attacker to know the inner parameters of a
model in the real world. For instance, the architecture and
parameters of deep models on cloud platforms cannot be
obtained. The attacker can only access the APIs opened
by cloud platforms. Thus, the black-box attack of neural
networks is more threatening.
Researchers have launched some black-box attacks on
deep neural networks recently. In [2], Papernot et al. pro-
posed that the attacker can train a substituted model, which
approaches the target model, and then generate adversar-
ial examples on the substituted model. Their experiments
showed that good transferability exists in adversarial exam-
ples, while the attack is not totally black-box. They have
knowledge of the training data and test the attack with
the same distributed data. In [5], Liu et al. adopted an
ensemble-based model to improve transferability and suc-
cessfully attacked Clarifai.com. However, the classifiers are
greatly different from detectors. For complicated detectors,
transferability is not very well.
The query-based black-box attack has also been explored
by researchers. In [38] [39] [40], researchers can get inner
information of models through lots of queries, which may
be impractical in real applications. In [41], thousands of
queries are made for low-resolution images to generate
adversarial examples. For high-resolution images, it still
takes tens of thousands of queries, which is also imprac-
tical. By querying the output of the target model, gradient
estimation based black-box attack methods were proposed
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in [4] [42]. Nevertheless, faced with high-resolution images,
millions of queries are required, which is very inefficient
and impractical. In [6], Brendel et al. proposed a decision-
based attack that starts from a large adversarial perturbation
and then seeks to reduce the perturbation while staying
adversarial. However, it takes 1,200,000 queries on average
to generate a good adversarial example for high-resolution
images. In this paper, we utilize the semantic segmentation
technique to speed up the process. Besides, we choose the
important pixels according to the returned probability. In
[16], Nina et al. proposed a greedy local search algorithm
to attack black-box models. The SBLS attack in this paper
is originated from [16], and we have extended it to cloud
platforms.
Several other forms of black-box attacks are studied in
recent works. In [43], Anish et al. constructed real-world
3D objects that consistently fool neural networks across a
wide distribution of angles and viewpoints. They showed
that adversarial examples are a practical concern for real-
world systems. In [19], Hossein et al. found that an API
generates completely different outputs for the noisy images,
while a human observer would perceive its original content.
We expand the experiment and use five image processing
techniques to attack models of five cloud platforms. For
detectors, we find Salt-and-Pepper noise is not valid enough
and other image processing methods may perform well. In
[44], Seong et al. inferred the inner information of models
through multiple queries and the revealed internal infor-
mation helps generate more effective adversarial examples
against a black-box model. Aiming at this, thousands of
models should be trained. However, this is impractical and
it is difficult to have multiple candidate models to infer
when handling detectors.
8 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this study, we conduct a comprehensive security study
for the cloud-based image detectors. We design four kinds
of attacks and verify them on major cloud service platforms.
According to our experimental results, we find that cloud-
based detectors are easily bypassed. We reported our find-
ings to the tested cloud platforms and received positive
feedbacks from them.
In the future, we are planning to further improve the ef-
fectiveness of our algorithms. In addition, a general method
to attack all platforms with a small number of queries
would be a meaningful topic. It is also important to design
the defense mechanisms for these cloud services against
adversarial example attacks. For instance, cloud platforms
can perform effective detection before outputting a label and
distinguish between malicious tests and normal samples.
We hope our work can help cloud platforms design secure
services and provide inspiration to researchers in the deep
learning security area.
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